Earlier today we detailed a vulnerability for our customers in a plugin by 10Web/TenWeb/Web-Dorado, where, while the vulnerability was fixed, the code still wasn’t properly secured. So that made what we then found while looking into the possibility that a vulnerability had also been fixed in their Photo Gallery (Photo Gallery by 10Web) plugin not all that surprising. While trying to confirm that there had been authenticated persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability that had been fixed in the plugin we got an error message that indicated there was and we then confirmed still is an authenticated local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the plugin. It really isn’t a great sign as the security of WordPress plugins that you can accidentally run into a vulnerability in a plugin with 300,000+ installs (according to wordpress.org).
Recently we added checks for possible local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerabilities to our proactive monitoring of changes being made to WordPress plugins to try to catch serious vulnerabilities when they are introduced in to plugins and considering the state of security of WordPress plugins in probably isn’t surprising we already caught another vulnerability of that type. Specifically we caught an authenticated local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in Shortcode Factory, which could also be exploited through cross-site request forgery (CSRF). The vulnerability had been in the plugin for nearly four years without getting noticed before.
In seeking to continue to improve our Plugin Security Checker, which does automated checks to try spot potential security issues in WordPress plugins, we log the results of checks of plugins in the Plugin Directory. The plugin ChimpMate was recently run through that and one of the issues identified in that was a possible local file inclusion vulnerability:
We recently noticed an authenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the plugin Vmax Project Manager. While writing up the details of that we were tracing back the code that would be involved in that and at first we couldn’t figure out how part of it would work. Then we figured that out and noticed that there is also an authenticated local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the plugin.
As we discussed in a previous post, while reviewing the changes in a recent version of the plugin PluginOps Page Builder we found that a local file inclusion version vulnerability had recently been fixed in the plugin. In looking over the changes that fixed that, we found that there was still a limited authenticated local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the plugin.
This Vulnerability Details posts provides the details of a vulnerability we ran across while collecting data on vulnerabliities discovered by others for our data set on vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins, so its contents are limited to customers of our service.If you are not currently a customer, you can sign up for free here. There are a lot of other reason that you will want to sign up beyond access to posts like this one, including that you would have already been warned about this vulnerability if your website was vulnerable due to it.
One of the things we do to make sure our customers have the best data on vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins is to monitor hacking attempts on our websites. Through that we recently came across a request for a file, /wp-content/plugins/posts-in-page/assets/posts_in_page_help_view.php, from the plugin Posts in Page.
Wordfence is putting WordPress website at risk by disclosing vulnerabilities in plugins with critical details needed to double check their work missing, in what appears to be an attempt to profit off of these vulnerabilities. We are releasing those details so that others can review the vulnerabilities to try to limit the damage Wordfence’s practice could cause.