01 Sep

What Happened With WordPress Plugin Vulnerabilities in August 2017

If you want the best information and therefore best protection against vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins we provide you that through our service.

Here is what we did to keep those are already using our service secure from WordPress plugin vulnerabilities during August (and what you have been missing out on if you haven’t signed up yet):

Plugin Security Reviews

Customers of the service can suggest and vote on plugins to have a security review done by us. This month we released details for a review of:

We don’t currently have any more plugins queue up for a review, so if you sign up now for the service, a plugin you suggest could be reviewed right away.

Plugin Vulnerabilities We Discovered and Publicly Disclosed This Month

We don’t just collect data on vulnerabilities in plugins that others have discovered, we also discover vulnerabilities through proactive monitoring of changes made to plugins, monitoring hackers activity, reviewing other vulnerabilities, and by doing additional checking on the security of plugins.

This month the most concerning vulnerability is a PHP object injection vulnerability in WP Smart Security, since that type of vulnerability is likely to be exploited and the vulnerability hasn’t been fixed yet.

Plugin Vulnerabilities We Helped Get Fixed This Month

Letting you know that you are using a vulnerable version of plugin is useful, but it is much more useful if you can fully protect yourself by simple updating to a new version. So we work with plugin developers to make sure that vulnerabilities get fixed. This month we helped to get vulnerabilities fixed in plugins that have 177,800+ active installs:

Plugin Vulnerabilities Added This Month That Are In The Current Version of the Plugins

Keeping your plugins up to date isn’t enough to keep you secure as these vulnerabilities in the current versions of plugins show:

Additional Vulnerabilities Added This Month

As usual, there were plenty of other vulnerabilities that we added to our data during the month. Most of the new vulnerabilities that were fixed this month are relatively minor.

30 Aug

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)/Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability in Traffic Manager

We recently started proactively monitoring for evidence of some high risk vulnerabilities when changes are made to WordPress plugins and if we had more customers we could expand the proactive monitoring to more types of vulnerabilities. In doing that we sometimes find that the possible vulnerable code isn’t exploitable, but we find another vulnerability while figuring that out, which doesn’t speak to WordPress plugins being all that secure. That is the case with the plugin Traffic Manager, where while looking into a possible issues that occurred while saving the plugin’s settings that the changing of the plugin’s setting lacked protection against cross-site request forgery (CSRF).

The code to save the settings is in the function flush() in the file /core/parameters.class.php, which runs when accessing several of the plugin’s admin pages. Those pages all look to be restricted to Administrator, due to access to them requiring the “activate_plugins” capability, which only Administrators normally have access to.

The saving of the settings will occur if the POST input “submitOptions” exists:

if (isset($_POST['submitOptions'])) {

The settings are not sanitized when saved to the database and at least the “metatag_copyright_override” setting is output on frontend pages without being escaped (on line 414 of the file /traffic-manager.php):

$dc .= '<meta name="DC.right" content="'.$this->get_param('metatag_copyright_override').'"/>'."\n" ;

That permits cross-site scripting (XSS) to occur.

We notified the developer of the issue a couple of week ago, but have yet to hear back from them.

Proof of Concept

The following proof of concept will cause an alert box with any accessible cookies to be shown on frontend pages of the WordPress, when submitted as an Administrator.

Make sure to replace “[path to WordPress]” with the location of WordPress.

<form action="http://[path to WordPress]/wp-admin/admin.php?page=traffic-manager/traffic-manager.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="submitOptions" value="update" />
<input type="hidden" name="metatag" value="on" />
<input type="hidden" name="metatag_copyright" value="on" />
<input type="hidden" name="metatag_copyright_override" value='"><script>alert(document.cookie);</script>' />
<input type="submit" value="Submit" />


  • August 14, 2017 – Developer notified.