A little over a month ago we put out a warning to be wary advisories from the company DefenseCode after our interaction with them regarding an issue with one of their advisories. In that instance their report claimed that they had contacted the developer of a plugin about a vulnerability that had been fixed in the plugin before they claim to have even first contacted the developer about it, which was odd. There was also this odd line:
Vendor did not respond to our repeated attempts to send this advisory. All users are strongly advised to update WordPress AccessPress Social Icons plugin to the latest available version.
What would have been the purpose of updating the plugin if the vulnerability hadn’t been fixed?
The solution section reads as follows:
Vendor resolved the security issues after we reported the vulnerabilities. All users are strongly advised to update WordPress Tribulant Newsletters plugin to the latest available version.
So the vulnerability was supposed to be fixed, but in what version? It wasn’t directly stated anywhere, but at the beginning of the advisory it listed “Versions” as “22.214.171.124 and below”.
The timeline provided didn’t match that though. Here is the timeline provide:
2017/04/04 Vendor contacted
2017/04/06 Vendor responded, update released
2017/05/29 Advisory released to the public
Looking at the development log for the plugin you can see that the next version after 126.96.36.199, 4.6.5, was released on January 26, 2017. Which is well before they claim to have contacted the developer. So maybe it was fixed in a later version? The problem with that being true would be that the most recent change made was on March 29, which is before they claim to have contacted the developer.
Looking at the changelog for version 4.6.5 we found two entries that might be related to one of the claimed issues, a “file disclosure” vulnerability:
- IMPROVE: Sorry, this file type is not permitted for security reasons
- IMPROVE: More secure permissions on export files
In testing the first few examples listed in the advisory in version 188.8.131.52 we found them exploitable and then we found them still exploitable in 4.6.5. In fact we found that in the current version they still are exploitable. After discovering that we promptly notified the developer and we received this response early today:
We are currently checking and will confirm whether or not it has been resolved.
If not, we will release an update later today still with escaped data.
From that it isn’t clear if the developer had intended to fix it before and didn’t (there doesn’t appear to be any change related to the issues in version 4.6.5 or a later version) or if there had never been an attempt. If DefenseCode had actually contacted the developer and was told it was fixed they should have checked to make sure the vulnerability was in fact fixed, because we often find that developers mistakenly think they have fixed vulnerabilities when they haven’t.
It also worth noting here that the “file disclosure” vulnerability listed in the advisory doesn’t appear to be a vulnerability as it would only be exploitable by Administrator-level users that would normally be able to accomplish what that does with their permitted capabilities, by say installing a plugin that allows browsing files.
For those using our service they have already been notified by now if they are vulnerable and given instructions on how to get in touch with us if they wanted help with dealing the situation, where they are using a plugin that has a vulnerability in the latest version of it.
For those instead relying on a service or a plugin that uses data from the WPScan Vulnerability Database, as often is the case they would be getting lower quality information as they have added the vulnerability today, but are claiming that it was fixed back in version 4.6.5:
This is yet another reminder of the importance to double check that any vulnerabilities that the WPScan Vulnerability Database’s data is claiming have been in your plugins and have been fixed have in fact been fixed. Or just use a service that does that in the first place. Making things more problematic, providers using their data often don’t disclose it is the true source of their data and or provide a disclaimer as to the quality issues that come with their data.