When it comes to the security of WordPress plugins what other security companies generally do is to add protection against vulnerabilities after they have already been widely exploited, which obviously won’t produce great results since there is a good chance the websites using their service have already been hacked by the time they do that. One of the ways we keep ahead of that is to monitor the closure of the 1,000 most popular WordPress plugins in the Plugin Directory, since that closure can be due to a security issue and even if it is not, we have found the plugins being closed often contain security vulnerabilities, and as was the case with one less than two weeks ago, ones likely to be exploited. Hackers seem to be doing that type of monitoring as well. Through that we found that the plugin Visual CSS Style Editor, which has 30,000+ active installs and was closed yesterday, has two vulnerabilities that when combined lead to a type of vulnerability hackers would be likely to exploit.
As the finding and exploitation of an authenticated option update vulnerability in the Freemius library, which is used by many WordPress plugins, by hackers shows is that there has not been enough focus on making sure that code that can lead to option update vulnerabilities is properly secured. Through our proactive monitoring of changes made to plugins in the Plugin Directory to try to catch serious vulnerabilities we have been on the lookout for some of those since November and we keep finding them, though as with the one we found in the plugin Estatik sometimes things are coded in way that limits the worst possible result of that (that doesn’t always appear to have been intentional). In this case of this plugin, poor security isn’t a new issue as we spotted the possibility that another vulnerability due to poor security was being exploited back in June of 2016.
On Monday while disclosing another option update vulnerability we noted that in the wake of one of those being widely exploited recently we had focused on finding more of those vulnerabilities, while it appears no one else in the WordPress security has done that (maybe because they can get away with lying about failing to protect against the widely exploited one). And no sooner than the next day did we find yet another vulnerability. We spotted it during our proactive monitoring of changes being made to WordPress plugins to try to catch serious vulnerabilities when they are introduced in to plugins, though the vulnerable code was not flagged by the software that we use to identify possible issues for us to review, instead that had flagged another possible instance of that same type of vulnerability in the same code and when we went to manually review the code we found the issue.
Back in June of last year we started doing proactive monitoring of changes being made to WordPress plugins to try to catch serious vulnerabilities when they are introduced in to plugins. Elements of that then became part of the basis of our Plugin Security Checker, an automated tool any one can use to check for possible security issues in plugins, which was introduced in October of last year. This week we replaced the previous system we had for handling the initial checking done as part of the proactive monitoring before a human becomes involved, with an expanded system that now incorporates more complex checking based off of code already included with the Plugin Security Checker. Just days into using that is has already help to detect a pretty nasty vulnerability in the plugin Smart Marketing SMS and Newsletters Forms, though one that looks like it could be used to knock a website offline, but not hack the website to gain control of it. The vulnerability is another one involving usage of the option_update() WordPress function that we have spotted recently, that function has recently been involved in the hacking of websites running WP GDPR Compliance and likely Kiwi Social Share as well.