24 Apr 2019

Arbitrary File Upload Vulnerability That Was in SupportCandy Now Receiving Exploit Attempts That Can Easily Fail

On April 5 due to our proactive monitoring of changes made to plugins in the Plugin Directory to try to catch serious vulnerabilities we disclosed an arbitrary file upload vulnerability we spotted in the plugin SupportCandy. A week after our disclosure Christian Angel independently found the vulnerability. The vulnerability was fixed on April 17.

In looking over the logs of a hacked website we were dealing with over at our main business we found that attempts to exploit this vulnerability have been occurring since at least April 20, though in a way that can fail even if a website is using a vulnerable version of the plugin. The exploit attempts involve sending a POST request to: [Read more]

19 Mar 2019

Other WordPress Plugin Vulnerability Data Sources Still Not Warning About Fixed or Unfixed Vulnerabilities in Easy WP SMTP

Today we have had a lot of traffic coming to our website to our posts about the vulnerabilities fixed and unfixed in the plugin Easy WP SMTP. The likely explanation is what else we have been seeing today, as in terms of dealing with the cleanup of hacked WordPress websites over at our main business and other mentions of hacked websites, we are seeing indications that the option update vulnerability that was fixed with that and possibly the other recently fixed option update vulnerability impacting many plugins are being exploited widely to change the WordPress option “siteurl” on websites to cause requests to be made to “getmyfreetraffic.com” (based on past experience with this type of vulnerability that likely isn’t the only thing the hackers are doing with the vulnerabilities on those websites).

Customers of our service using that plugin have already been warned about the fixed and unfixed vulnerabilities in that plugin, but for anyone relying on other data sources for info on vulnerabilities in plugins they use, they are so far in the dark. [Read more]

4 Mar 2019

WPScan Vulnerability Database Fails to Credit Us, But Did Incorrectly Claim Plugin Had Been Fixed From Freemius Vulnerability

When it comes to information on security topics, whether security journalism or elsewhere, what we have found is that often incorrect information is provided that someone could have seen was incorrect if they could check the original source for it, but the original source isn’t listed. That would be the case with something from the WPScan Vulnerability Database’s entry created on Friday on the authenticated option update vulnerability in the Freemius library we discussed Tuesday:

[Read more]

10 Dec 2018

WPScan Vulnerability Database Weeks Behind in Warning About Exploited Vulnerability in WordPress Plugin

On Friday we noted that during the month of November we not only added many more new vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins to our data set than the widely used WPScan Vulnerability Database (50 to 11), but we actually disclosed more vulnerabilities ourselves than they added in total during the month (21 to 11). Considering that all the vulnerabilities we discover are publicly disclosed and you can even access a RSS feed just of them, it doesn’t speak highly of the quality of their data set to be missing them.

The handling of one of the vulnerabilities we disclosed is of particular concern for anyone relying on their data, as it was an option update vulnerability we disclosed on November 12 that looks to have been on hackers’ radar by at least November 15. It was only added to WPScan’s data on the December 7th: [Read more]

30 Nov 2018

Not Really a WordPress Plugin Vulnerability – Week of November 30, 2018

In reviewing reports of vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins we often find that there are reports for things that don’t appear to be vulnerabilities. For more problematic reports we release posts detailing why the vulnerability reports are false, but there have been a lot of that we haven’t felt rose to that level. In particular are items that are not outright false, just the issue is probably more accurately described as a bug. For those that don’t rise to level of getting their own post we now place them in a weekly post when we come across them.

Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in WP-DBManager

When you combine two entities that don’t seem to be concerned about the accuracy of their claims of vulnerabilities related to WordPress not surprisingly the results could be bad. Earlier this week the WPScan Vulnerability Database added this entry for a claimed arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the plugin WP-DBManager: [Read more]

19 Nov 2018

The Data in the WPScan Vulnerability Database Is Definitely Not Confirmed/Validated

Among the many lies told by the company behind the very popular WordPress security plugin Wordfence Security, Defiant, one that really stands out to us personally is a lie they told that relates to something that as far as we are aware we uniquely do when it comes to collecting data on vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins. In response to a complaint about the data they use in trying to tell people if an update to a plugin is a security update they claimed to rely on “confirmed/validated” data for that. In truth their source, the WPScan Vulnerability Database, explicitly notes that they haven’t verified the vulnerabilities in their data set. As far as we are aware we are the only ones that actually do the work it takes to confirm and validate vulnerabilities, which provides our customer with higher quality data and doesn’t leave them unaware that vulnerabilities haven’t actually been fixed. We recently ran across an instance of where the WPScan Vulnerability Database clearly didn’t do that work, where we had at first thought that maybe we had missed something that we should have noticed.

Back on October 29 we wrote a post detailing an authenticated persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the plugin AMP for WP – Accelerated Mobile Pages, which had been fixed, but the plugin was closed on the Plugin Directory, so it wouldn’t have been easy to update to a fixed version (though we were available to help our customer do that). Then on November 5 we noted that hackers look to have already started probing for usage of the plugin, which was a concern since the plugin still had not been restored to the Plugin Directory. [Read more]

12 Oct 2018

Not Really a WordPress Plugin Vulnerability – Week of October 12, 2018

In reviewing reports of vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins we often find that there are reports for things that don’t appear to be vulnerabilities. For more problematic reports we release posts detailing why the vulnerability reports are false, but there have been a lot of that we haven’t felt rose to that level. In particular are items that are not outright false, just the issue is probably more accurately described as a bug. For those that don’t rise to level of getting their own post we now place them in a weekly post when we come across them.

Arbitrary File Viewing Vulnerability in Advanced uploader

Last week we wrote about the security community’s problem understanding the basics when it comes to arbitrary file viewing and local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerabilities. We ran across that again with a false report of an arbitrary file viewing vulnerability in the plugin Advanced uploader. On one of our websites we had this attempt from a hacker to try to exploit what they thought was a vulnerability in the plugin: [Read more]

4 Oct 2018

The WPScan Vulnerability Database Is Missing a Lot of New Vulnerabilities

If you are looking for data on vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins you appear to have a lot of options, but in reality many sources actually just reuse data from the same source, the WPScan Vulnerability Database. The true source of the data is often is not disclosed by the provider.  Even when they are upfront about that, we have yet to see a provider that is also upfront about the major limitations of that data source. Sometimes things are worse, whether it is Wordfence (aka Defiant) falesly and baselessly claiming that the data is “official” and “Confirmed/Validated” or MainWP stating that “The Vulnerability database updates itself real-time so you don’t miss out on any vulnerabilities”. Updating in real-time wouldn’t mean that you wouldn’t miss out on any vulnerabilities since that would depend on the breadth of the data, not on how fast changes are applied. In reality you will actually miss out on many vulnerabilities.

As reminder of the actual quality of their data, take a look at their current listing of the latest plugin vulnerabilities in their data set: [Read more]

1 Oct 2018

It’s No Wonder Security Is In Such Bad Shape When the Security Community Doesn’t Understand the Basics of Vulnerability Types

One of the things that you get when using our data on vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins either through our long time service or our new newsletters instead of trying to do things on your own or using lower quality data sources, is that we actually check over the reports and provide an accurate information on them. For a fair amount of reports the original discloser has provided inaccurate information about the vulnerability (or there isn’t even a vulnerability).

One area we see a lot of confusion, whether it be with members of the security community or hackers is with arbitrary file viewing and local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerabilities. A recent example where things got quite mixed up and where other data sources would have lead you astray involved two vulnerabilities disclosed by Manuel Garcia Cardenas a couple of weeks ago. [Read more]